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Abstract
Intentionalism is a research program that seeks to explain facts about mean-
ing and communication in psychological terms, with our capacity for inten-
tion recognition playing a starring role. My aim here is to recommend a
methodological reorientation in this program. Instead of a focus on intuitive
counterexamples to proposals about necessary-and-sufficient conditions, we
should aim to investigate the psychological mechanisms whose activities and
interactions explain our capacity to communicate. Taking this methodologi-
cal reorientation to heart, I sketch a theory of the cognitive architecture un-
derlying language use that I have defended elsewhere. I then show how this
theory can be used to give an account of non-communicative language use—a
phenomenon that has long posed a challenge to intentionalism.
1 The Intentionalist Program
My topic is a research program variously called ‘intentionalism’, ‘Griceanism’, and
‘intention-based semantics’. Following Grice (; ; ), contributors to
this program have sought to show how facts about meaning and communication
boil down to facts about our psychology, with a special emphasis on our capacity
for revealing and recognizing intentions.
The central claim of intentionalism is that what someone means when speaking
or otherwise attempting to communicate is a matter of what they communicatively
intend. An agent communicatively intends something when they make an utter-
ance with the intention of having a certain effect on their addressee’s mind, partly
*This essay will be published as a chapter in Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of
Brian Loar, edited by Arthur Sullivan, which is under contract with Routledge. I am grateful to Eric
Mandelbaum, Gary Ostertag, and Elmar Unnsteinsson for comments on an earlier draft.
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by way of revealing to them the intention to do so. Communication happens when
the addressee recognizes what kind of effect the agent intends to have on them. An
‘utterance’, in the sense at issue here, can be any overt behavior that serves as ev-
idence of the agent’s intentions, and needn’t be verbal or linguistic. In the right
circumstances, one can communicate via an idiosyncratic gesture, by making a U-
Turn on one’s scooter, or by any other observable action. What language adds to
this picture is a powerful way of offering rich and systematic evidence of what one
means.
In the work of Brian Loar and Stephen Schiffer, intentionalism became part of
a research program whose explicit aim is to show how meaning fits into the natural
order. One thing that makes this a pressing issue is that the kind of communicating
that we do—particularly, but not only, with language—is hard to come by elsewhere
in nature. A few other species of animals are capable of formulaic noises, gestures,
or dances that prompt their conspecifics to avoid threats and seize opportunities
in their immediate environments. But their simple signaling systems are so much
less powerful and flexible than the distinctively human variety that the latter almost
certainly demands a sui generis explanation.
The quest to naturalize meaning would have seemed particularly pressing in the
mid-th century, when philosophy still suffered from the hangovers of behavior-
ism and positivism and semantic vocabulary was met with distrust. Loar, Schiffer,
and others conceived of intentionalism as part of a larger reductionist project: first
use a broadly Gricean strategy to reduce facts about what words and sentencesmean
to facts about what speakers mean by them, then reduce facts about what speakers
mean to facts about their psychological states, and then find some way to further re-
duce the needed parts of psychology to more basic domains—ultimately to physics.
My focus here will be on the part of this project that belongs to the philosophy
of language. What are the prospects for a reductive explanation of the facts about
human communication, including linguistic communication, in terms of intention
recognition and related psychological capacities? In particular, how should this re-
search program be updated in light of the theoretical and empirical resources now
available?
2 Intentionalism and Explication
Understood as a reductive program, intentionalism seeks to explain higher-level
phenomena to do with meaning in terms of lower-level phenomena to do with psy-
chology and ultimately physics. How is this talk of ‘levels’ and ‘explanation’ to be
understood?
In particular, see Loar (, , , ) and Schiffer (, , , , , ).
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Beginning with Grice, the central hypotheses of intentionalists have often taken
the form of explications such as ().
() “Umeant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A,U uttered
x intending
(i) A to produce a particular response r
(ii) A to think (recognize) that U intends (i)
(iii) A to fulfil (i) on the basis of his fulfilment of (ii). (Grice, , )
Although these explications are often stated with symmetric connectives like ‘iff ’
or ‘=df’, it is clear that something asymmetric is always intended. The schematic
statements on the left are there to have light shed on them, and those to the right
are there to do the shedding. The right is the explicans to the left’s explicandum. The
left is a high-level description of the same phenomenon that the right describes at a
lower level.
What is the point of explication? One traditional answer is that explications offer
analyses of concepts. On this view, () is an attempt to articulate what is already
there in one of our ordinary concepts of meaning. It is an attempt to unpack the
concept’s underlying structure in terms of more fundamental concepts.
Somework in the intentionalist program—particularlymost earlywork—makes
sense only if we think of explication as something like conceptual analysis. Grice
begins ‘Meaning’ () by distinguishing natural and nonnatural meaning before
subdividing the latter into timeless meaning and utterer’s meaning. His method is
to attend to subtle cues about our ordinary usage of ‘means’ and its cognates. “I
cannot say ‘those spots meant measles, but he hadn’t got measles’ ”, Grice tells us,
but one can say, “ ‘Those three rings on the bell…mean that the bus is full’…and
go on to say, ‘but it isn’t in fact full—the conductor has made a mistake’ ” (Grice,
, –). The ‘can’ here is that of felicitous usage. As competent users of the
English verb(s), ‘tomean’, we are intended to knowingly agree. Grice goes on to offer
a tentative explication for each kind of nonnatural meaning. In later work, Grice
and others would painstakingly hone these explications by means of the method
of cases. Particularly when it came to utterer’s meaning (a.k.a. ‘speaker meaning’),
an enormous number of explications have been proposed, and each has been met
with intuitive counterexamples. These counterexamples take a standard form. A
situation is presented in which someone meets the proposed criteria for utterer’s
meaning but intuitively fails to instantiate the concept under investigation (or vice
versa). As Grice (, ) puts one such coup de grace, “I do not think that one
See, especially, Bach and Harnish (); Davis (, ); Grice (, ); Neale ();
Schiffer (); Sperber and Wilson (); Strawson ().
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would want to say thatU hadmeant something by throwing the banknote out of the
window”. Again, we are meant to nod along: the key premises of these arguments
are judgments about how we, ordinary speakers, would use the word ‘mean’. Given
this methodology, in which an explication’s success hangs on its accordance with
ordinary usage, the aim of explication can only be to analyze our concepts or spell
out the meanings of our words.
This project is methodologically ill conceived. One reason for pessimism is in-
ductive. Since Plato, philosophers have been trying very hard to give necessary-and-
sufficient conditions for some concepts in terms of others in a way that stands up to
intuitive scrutiny. So far we have succeeded approximately zero times. This is not
conclusive proof that the job can’t be done, any more than the failures of alchemists
prove that lead can’t be made into gold. But it should not inspire confidence. An-
other reason for pessimism arises from the broader goals of intentionalism. We seek
to boil meaning down to psychology and ultimately to physics. But psychologists
and physicists discover new things all the time, and they sometimes even engineer
new concepts in which to frame these new things. Most of us therefore lack some of
the concepts (and most of the truths) in terms of which statements about meaning
would have to make their way down the conceptual hierarchy. Our intuitions about
counterexamples cannot bear the epistemic load of this procedure.
By the early s, we find Loar and Schiffer explicitly distancing themselves
from conceptual analysis. Loar (, –) tells us that “philosophical explication
does not have to be seen as Moorean analysis”, argues that it needn’t “depend on any
non-natural analyticity”, and gestures at explication as a naturalistically respectable
practice in the philosophy of science. According to Loar, the aim of an explication is
to conservatively replace ordinary concepts with concepts capable of doing serious
theoretical work.
Schiffer (, ) is even more explicit about his methodological aims:
Certain intention theoretical writings have, unwittingly, tended to fos-
ter the misleading impression that the program was an exercise in con-
ceptual analysis, the aim and the end of which was the definition of
various ordinary language semantical idioms in terms of certain com-
plexes of propositional attitudes…. In fact, the program need have no
truck with conceptual analysis…. The intention theorist seeks to re-
duce the having of content of marks and sounds to the having of con-
tent of psychological states.
How, then, to proceed? Schiffer retains his own earlier explications, but adorns the
Both this point and the snark accompanying it are unoriginal; for more of both, see Fodor (,
, chs.–). The ur-source of skepticism about analysis is Quine ().
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central terms of his explicanda with asterisks—‘meaning*’ instead of ‘meaning’, and
so on—in order to mark them out as technical terms rather than items from our
ordinary vocabulary. We should understand the explications as “stipulative defini-
tions” which “may not be realized” (, ). Once thereby linked to lower-level
claims, the top-level claims serve as empirical hypotheses about what people are do-
ing when they speak. We all know that speakers mean things by their words. But
do they also mean* things by their words, with all that that (stipulatively) entails?
Schiffer’s claim—an empirical one—is that they do.
This methodology is a clear improvement over the idea that intentionalism is
a project in conceptual analysis. It allows us to be in the business of discovering
the hidden underlying nature of meaning and communication, rather than merely
reformulating what is supposedly already implicit in our conceptual schemes. It
gives sense to the idea that our reductive project ultimately aim to recruit parts of
science that most of us don’t know much about. And it relieves us of the misguided
task of testing explications against our intuitive judgments about cases.
Or, at least, it should. ’s Schiffer still appeals to our judgments about cases—
for example, when arguing that Grice’s explication of utterer’s meaning works better
as an explication of ‘telling’ (Schiffer, , ). There is also something fishy about
the fact that his explications, presented in this new methodological context, are the
very same explications that he’d painstakingly arrived at a decade earlier via the
method of cases. Given our rejection of conceptual analysis and, with it, the central
methodological role played by intuitive counterexamples, aren’t these explications
ill-gotten gains? Shouldn’t we have to begin from scratch with careful, empirically-
grounded theorizing about what kind of psychological states and processes explain
our communicative capacities?
3 Intentionalism and Mechanistic Explanation
Latter-day intentionalists have mostly eschewed the explication-centric methodol-
ogy of Grice, Loar, and Schiffer. In part, this is because the intentionalist program
has migrated from philosophy into cognitive science. Some have focused on de-
veloping models of the cognitive processes by means of which humans recognize
communicative intentions. Some have investigated the processes by which which
we design our utterances to affect particular addressees’ mental states. Others
have focused on the interrelated development of intention-recognition, communi-
Carston (); Csibra (); Keysar (); Sperber andWilson (, );Wilson and Sper-
ber ().
Brennan and Hanna (); Clark (); Clark and Carlson (); Clark and Marshall ();
Clark and Schaefer ().
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cation, and language in children. Others have investigated the role of intention-
recognition in the evolution of language and communication, in part through com-
parative study of human and nonhuman communication. Thiswork belongs to the
intentionalist program. But its methodology differs from earlier work. One finds
few explications in the style of (), and even fewer intuition-driven counterexam-
ples. In their place is a wide range of empirical considerations, all bearing on the
extent to which our communicative capacities can be explained in terms of our un-
derlying capacity for intention recognition. Although we are still dealing with a
kind of reductive explanation, it is not of the kind pursued by Loar and Schiffer.
I think that we can make sense of this shift in the methodology of intentional-
ists by considering some recent work by philosophers of science on the nature of
reductive explanation in the special sciences more generally.
Consider the model of inter-theoretic reduction that was, until recently, dom-
inant in the philosophy of science. Suppose we have a high-level theory that is
framed in a proprietary stock of predicates and we want to reduce it to a lower-
level theory with its own predicates. To do this, we formulate bridge principles that,
together with the the laws of the low-level theory, entail the laws of the high-level
theory (Nagel, , ch.). These bridge principles take the form of biconditionals
that connect the two theories’ vocabularies. By thus reducing the high-level the-
ory to the low-level theory, we explain the truth of the former in terms of the more
fundamental and better-established truth of the latter.
A lesson of recent work in the philosophy of science is that although this sort of
account may make sense of reductive explanations in physics—for example, the re-
duction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics (Nagel, , –)—it mis-
characterizes the kinds of successful reductive explanations that one finds in biol-
ogy, neuroscience, psychology, and other high-level special sciences. One big prob-
lem with the traditional model is that formulating predictive laws isn’t among the
central activities of these sciences, and so it is not possible to show how such laws
stand in entailment relations to laws at higher or lower levels.
A wave of recent work has argued that the dominant form of reductive expla-
nation in biology and related special sciences involves showing how processes at
one level are explained by the activities of underlying mechanisms at lower levels.
Godfrey-Smith (, ) summarizes recent thinking about this style of explana-
tion as follows:
Whenwe look at successful reductionist research programs in areas like
Bloom (); Csibra (); Hacquard and Lidz (); Tomasello ().
Moore (); Scott-Phillips (); Sperber (); Tomasello ().
See, e.g. Bechtel (); Bechtel and Abrahamsen (); Bechtel and Richardson ();
Godfrey-Smith (); Machamer et al. ().
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biology, we do see an accumulation of information about how various
biologically important processes occur. We now have a good under-
standing of processes like photosynthesis, respiration, protein synthe-
sis, the transmission of signals in the brain, the action of muscles, the
immune response, and so on. This sort of work can reasonably be, and
often is, described as reductionist. We are taking a high-level process
or capacity, and explaining how it works in terms of lower-level mech-
anisms and entities.
In mechanistic explanations, relations between levels of explanation are part-whole
relations rather than entailment relations. In molecular biology, for example, re-
ductive explanation usually amounts to identifying the distinct physical parts of a
larger system and showing how their chemical and mechanical activities add up to
the activities and the system as a whole. To explain the transmission of chemical
energy through synapses, for example, we identify the parts of neurons that con-
tribute to this process and show how their activities contribute to the larger process
in which they play a role (Machamer et al., , –).
More recently, the idea ofmechanistic explanation has been extended to charac-
terize reductive explanation in cognitive science. In this context, the mechanisms
in question may be subsystems that are individuated in terms of their information-
processing roles within a larger system, rather than as physical parts of an entity
(Bechtel, , ch.). Still, it makes sense to explain the activities and capacities of a
system in terms of the capacities, activities, and interactions of its subsystems. This
is just the project of investigating human cognitive architecture, which has been a
central task in cognitive science for decades.
My point in summarizing these methodological ideas is that I think that they
should be self-consciously absorbed by the intentionalist program. Like the do-
mains that have interested the new mechanists, our explananda are not well under-
stood in terms of scientific laws or even well-organized theories. There are no laws
of speaker meaning or communication. It is a bit strange even to say that we have a
theory of these things that we are seeking to reduce. Even semantics, which is now a
mature scientific research program, does not produce laws but a body of lexical se-
mantic values and composition rules, mental representations of which are thought
to play a causal role in language processing.
What intentionalism seeks to explain is the human capacity to communicate.
Our method for doing this should be to study the systems and subsystems of the
mind that are at work when we mean things by our utterances and work out the
E.g. Bechtel (); Godfrey-Smith (); Piccinini and Craver (). There are, of course,
many more-or-less methodologically self-conscious precursors to this approach to cognitive science,
and that is part of the new mechanists’ point.
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meanings of others’ utterances. We should study how these systems work, how they
collaborate, why they sometimes fail, how they evolved in our ancestors, and how
they come online in children. In other words: we should study the nature and ori-
gins of the cognitive architecture underlying human communication.
This methodology is already embodied, if not explicitly avowed, in some of the
cognitive-scientific contributions to intentionalism that I mentioned at the start of
this section. There are even glimmers of it in some work Grice, Loar, and Schiffer. I
will point to some of these glimmers in §, but I will also argue that they have tended
to go undeveloped, in part because of an excessive and sometimes competing focus
on explication. Although we needn’t eschew explications entirely, I think that we
should give them a secondary role in our theorizing.
Here is what I propose to do in the rest of this paper. First, in §, I will outline
an intentionalist answer to the question of what goes into our capacity to commu-
nicate. In §, I will sketch a partial theory of the cognitive architecture underlying
communication. In later sections, I will put these ideas to work, both by showing
how they settle issues within the intentionalist program (§§–) and by showing
how they dissolve certain objections to it (§).
4 What Makes up our Capacity to Communicate?
What about us makes human communication so much more flexible and powerful
than communication in other species? I will focus on three psychological capacities
that together go a long way toward explaining what is unique about us. These are
mindreading, planning, and language.
To mindread is to treat a part of the world as an agent and predict or infer its
mental states. Humans have a uniquely powerful capacity and compulsion to min-
dread. We continually track the thoughts and motives of the people around us, and
our go-to strategy for understanding their behavior is by reasoning about their states
ofmind. Mindreading has been one of themost intensively researched topics in cog-
nitive science since the s, spanning developmental and cognitive psychology,
cognitive ethology, and the philosophy of psychology.
To identify a communicative intention is to engage in an advanced form ofmin-
dreading. It is to infer the intention as the best explanation of an utterer’s behavior,
in light of the utterance they’ve produced and whatever other background infor-
mation may be available and relevant. Mindreading also plays a crucial role in the
performance of communicative acts, since designing an effective utterance means
predicting how it will impact the mind of one’s addressee.
By planning, Imean the process of forming intentions and reasoning from those
intentions together with one’s beliefs to further intentions, all for the purposes of

coordinating one’s actions. Planning has been a central topic in the philosophy of
action since the seminal work of Bratman (), who emphasized that serving as
the premises and conclusions of practical reasoning is central to the functional role
of intentions.
One part of planning is conceiving of options and choosing between them by
weighing preferences and emotional reactions. This is a process that decision the-
orists, psychologists, and neuroscientists have long studied. One of Bratman’s cen-
tral insights was to recognize that a theory of choice would capture only one narrow
step in the planning process. This is because the way that an agent makes any given
choice is constrained by the intentions they have formed as a result of prior practi-
cal reasoning. To choose is normally to select a subplan of one’s prior plan, a way of
implementing intentions that one already has. Intentions are relatively stable com-
mitments that play a dual role of controlling action and constraining the options that
must be considered in further practical reasoning. Planning is a way of overcom-
ing our cognitive limitations by letting prior decisions lessen the burden of making
further choices.
Our capacity for planning is part of our capacity for communication because
communicative intentions function in the usual way as both the premises and con-
clusions of practical reasoning. Each communicative intention is itself a subplan of
our other prior intentions, the result of practical reasoning about the proper means
to our broader ends. If what I communicatively intend when I say ‘buy me a drink’
is for you to form an intention to buy me a drink, I do so not for no reason, but pre-
sumably as a means to the end of getting a drink. Each communicative intention
itself has the structure of a complex plan: my intention for you to recognize what
kind of effect I intend to have on you is intended to be a partial means to the end of
having that very effect. This is what sets communicative intentions apart from less
cooperative ways of getting people to change what they believe and intend, and it is
what allows us to use utterances that give evidence of our intentions as a means of
realizing those very intentions.
Once a communicative intention is formed, it must serve as a premise in further
reasoning about what kind of utterance to make. If you and I have a habit of buying
each other drinks, I may be able to get my point across by simply pointing to the
bar and miming the action of tilting a glass toward my lips. If I can’t rely on this
background, I might have to be more explicit: ‘How about if you get me an IPA
for this round and I’ll get the next?’. Choosing between these and the many other
possible ways of getting you to recognize my intended effect depends on fast and
I use ‘plan’ and ‘intention’ more or less interchangably, but I take ‘plan’ to have the connotation of
complexity. As Bratman puts it, “intentions are, so to speak, the building blocks of…plans, and plans
are intentions writ large” (, ).
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intelligent practical reasoning that draws on both my prior plans and what I know
about you, including what I am able to infer about your actual and potential mental
states.
What I have said so far applies to nonlinguistic as well as linguistic communi-
cation, which are both, at their core, driven by planning and mindreading. What
distinguishes the two is that linguistic utterances are the product of a capacity that
allows us to encode and decode powerful and highly structured evidence of our in-
tentions. (I will say more about this in §.)
Thedistinctive claimof intentionalism, as I conceive of it, is that intention recog-
nition is the process at the core of distinctively human communication, and that lan-
guage plays a subservient role when it is involved at all. The most explicit articula-
tions of this claim in the literature have been due to Sperber andWilson (, ch.)
and Scott-Phillips (, ch.), whomake the point by distinguishing twomodels of
communication. In the ‘code model’, a sender encodes some informational content
in a signal and sends it through a transmission channel to a receiver, who decodes
the signal to access the content. In the ‘ostensive-inferential’ model, communica-
tion is a process in which the receiver must combine the evidence gleaned from
the sender’s utterance with other information at their disposal in order to infer the
sender’s intention. The two models may be combined when an encoding–decoding
process subserves intention recognition. Following Sperber andWilson, I claim that
this is what is going on when we communicate with language: a speaker encodes
evidence of what they communicatively intend in a linguistic utterance, but merely
decoding this utterance is never sufficient on its own for successful communication;
further inference is always required to identify the speaker’s intention.
Intentionalism is usually associatedwith the idea that speakermeaning—and so,
intention recognition—takes explanatory priority over linguistic meaning. There is
a clear sense inwhich I agreewith this claim: I think that linguistic processing always
subserves intention recognition in human communication. This is a claim about the
priority of one process over another in actual episodes of communication.
There are other priority claims that might interest us as well. Some have argued
that language evolved to subserve communication by intention recognition, or that
the biological function of language is to play this role. Similarly, some have argued
that mindreading plays a central role in certain aspects of language acquisition—a
view on which at least some of the mechanisms underlying intention recognition
are developmentally prior to the capacity for language.
These are interesting claims, and if they turn out to be true, then they lend strong
See, e.g., Scott-Phillips (); Tomasello (). For criticisms of these views, see Bar-On ();
Chomsky (); Hauser et al. ().
See, e.g., Bloom (); Hacquard and Lidz (); Tomasello ().
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support to intentionalism. But I want to stress that intentionalism, as I have artic-
ulated it, does not entail these evolutionary or developmental claims, and can be
true even if they are false. It could be that our language mechanism(s) evolved to
play some non-communicative role but were later repurposed for communication.
Likewise, it might be that the biological function of the mechanisms underlying
our language capacity is not, or is not only to subserve communication, but that we
routinely use it to communicate anyway. (By analogy, typing on a keyboard would
not be the biological function of human fingers even in a near-future dystopia in
which that’s all we use them for.) Similarly, it could be that language acquisition is
accomplished almost entirely by domain-specific mechanisms and does not recruit
themechanisms underlying intention-recognition. But this independence in acqui-
sition is compatible with my claim that language subserves intention recognition in
communication. So although intentionalism has often been presented as having
evolutionary and developmental components, and although I find those ideas to be
interesting and worth pursuing, I wish to separate my central claim from them here.
5 Communication and Cognitive Architecture
How are our capacities for mindreading, planning, and language realized in our
cognitive architecture? In previous work, I have defended a partial answer to this
question that draws on a model of the mind originally developed by Fodor ().
On Fodor’s view, the mind is divided into one or more central-cognitive systems
and an array of peripheral input-output systems thatmediate between central cogni-
tion and our sensory systems (in perception) and motor systems (in action). These
input–output systems, or modules, are set apart by a cluster of features: they are
fast, automatic, domain-specific, fuctionally dissociable from other systems, and in
some cases associated with specific brain areas or evolutionary origins. The trait
that Fodor has most emphasized is that modules are informationally isolated from
each other and from central cognition. Although they send outputs to and/or take
inputs from central cognition, their internal processes are insensitive to beliefs and
memories to which central-cognition has access. Instead, they draw on proprietary
databases of information to which central-cognition in turn lacks access. This al-
lows them to perform their tasks quickly and in a way that generally isn’t under
voluntary control. Because their informational resources are circumscribed, mod-
ular systems are amenable to computational modeling in a way that abstracts from
other cognitive resources. This sort of computational modeling tends to be less ef-
fective when it comes to what Fodor thought of as central-cognitive systems, which
are less restricted in the information on which they can draw.
One of Fodor’s main examples of amodular input-output system is the language

system. On Fodor’s view, linguistic theory is the study of the databases onwhich lin-
guistic processing draws and psycholinguistics is the study of how these databases
develop and are deployed in the perception and production of speech. In recent
work, I have argued that the language system includes a semantic subsystem, and
that our best current semantic theories should be understood as models of this sub-
system’s proprietary database of information, on which it draws in order to bridge
the gap between syntactic representations to semantic representations in both the
perception and production of utterances (Harris, , FC).
In language perception, the inputs to semantic processing are LFs, which are
the outputs of syntactic processing. The outputs of semantic processing, I claim, are
incomplete representations of the communicatively intended effect associated with
the sentence being perceived. When I hear someone utter ‘he lives in Montana’, my
semantic system outputs a representation of a property shared by beliefs that pred-
icate living in Montana of some male individual. This representation is passed to
the central-cognitive system responsible for mindreading, where it serves as partial
and defeasible evidence of the kind of mental state that the speaker intended to put
me in. In this case, mymindreading systemwould have to infer whichmale is being
referred to, whether the speaker is being wholly literal, and, if not, what else they
might mean.
In language production, the system responsible for planning sends instructions
to the language system, which transforms these instructions into phonological rep-
resentations of an utterance, which are then turned into motor instructions for the
relevant articulatory system. I will refer to the instruction that my planning system
sends to my language system as an utterance plan. I assume that utterance plans are
themselves intentions. When one produces an utterance in order to communicate,
one’s utterance plan is itself a subplan of one’s communicative intention. Language
production has been much less studied than language perception, and there are dif-
ficult questions about how each step in this process works. I will bracket most of
these questions here. In particular, it is unclear just what information is included in
utterance plans. Suffice it to say that utterance plans must include some informa-
tion about the mental attitude and content of a mental state to be produced, as well
as some other crucial information about an addressee and the context. For example,
if the content to be communicated is about the addressee, then the language system
will need this information so that it can select a second-person pronoun rather than
a third-person pronoun in the appropriate position.
In brief, my argument for the modularity of semantics rests on explanatory in-
ferences from four empirical premises. First, contemporary semantics has had to
I consider the issue in (slightly) more detail in Harris ().
Formore detailed versions of these arguments andwhat I take to be their consequences, seeHarris

painstakingly reverse engineer all that we know about expressions’ semantic values
and the principles by which they compose. The best explanation is that this in-
formation is inaccessible to central cognition, and so unsusceptible to more direct
forms of study, such as introspection. Second, semanticists have had a lot of suc-
cess with this project, and have been able to generate precise empirical predictions
about sentence meanings from concise semantic theories. By contrast, we have no
predictive theory of the processes underlyingmindreading. Thebest explanation for
this is that semantic processing, unlike central cognition, depends on an encapsu-
lated body of information that can be concisely modeled. Third, our beliefs, desires,
and intentions seem to have little impact on how we compose the meanings of the
sentences we perceive. For example, strongly held false beliefs about semantics do
nothing to interfere with one’s semantic processing ability. The best explanation is
that the information drawn on by semantic processing is largely sequestered from
our beliefs and other central-cognitive states. Fourth, contemporary semantics tells
us that the principles that guide semantic processing are framed in terms of concepts
like semantic type, numerical index, and assignment function, but most competent
speakers lack the ability to form beliefs and other central-cognitive representations
in terms of these concepts. The best explanation of this is that the semantic mod-
ule has its own proprietary conceptual repertoire, which only partially overlaps the
conceptual repertoire of central cognition. These arguments give us a compelling
reason to think that the body of information that underlies a speaker’s semantic
competence is cut off from their beliefs, intentions, and other central-cognitive rep-
resentations, and that it is this body of information of which semantics is the study.
My position that semantic processing is subserved by a subsystem of a modular
language system leaves open a range of positions about the cognitive architecture
underlying mindreading and planning.
One possibility is thatmindreading and planning are not the products of distinct
subsystems at all, but are both grounded in a general-purpose central-cognitive sys-
tem. Some have read this view into Fodor (), who points out that there seem to
be no principled limits to the kinds of beliefs, intentions, or other central-cognitive
representations that may, on occasion, factor intomindreading and planning. Some
psychologists have likewise argued, mostly on developmental grounds, that min-
dreading is an application of our general-purpose cognitive capacity for theorizing
about the world.
On the other hand, some have found reasons other than informational isolation
to posit specialized mindreading and planning systems. Unlike various other kinds
of theoretical knowledge, mindreading is universal to cognitively unimpaired hu-
(, FC).
Gopnik and Meltzoff (); Perner (); Wellman ().

mans, develops on a relatively fixed and predictable schedule, is selectively impaired
in people with autism (Baron Cohen, ; Baron-Cohen et al., ) and in people
with damage to certain brain areas (Frith and Frith, ; Rowe et al., ). These
considerations have led some to posit one or more innate, domain-specific mech-
anisms and/or bodies of knowledge underlying the mindreading capacity. Some
have argued on similar grounds that planning is the product of one or more dedi-
cated cognitive mechanisms And some have argued that the systems underlying
planning and mindreading are deeply intertwined, on the grounds that mindread-
ing recruits the planning system in order to simulate others’ planning processes.
Although I find some of the arguments for discrete systems underlying min-
dreading and planning persuasive, I won’t take a stand on these issues here. I will
sometimes speak of ‘the planning system’ or ‘the mindreading system’, but these
phrases should be understood to be compatible with the possibility that mindread-
ing andplanning are performedby the same system, or by someperhaps-overlapping
constellation of systems.
6 Semantics Doesn’t Reduce to Propositional Attitudes
My position on the informational isolation of semantics is incompatible with the
view that the semantic facts about natural language can be wholly explained by
speakers’ propositional attitudes—a view that has often been endorsed by inten-
tionalists. This view is suggested, for example, by Grice’s (, ) original, albeit
thoroughly hedged explication of utterance-type meaning:
“xmeansNN (timeless) that so-and-so” might as a first shot be equated
with some statement or disjunction of statements about what “people”
(vague) intend (with qualifications about “recognition”) to effect by x.
Loar and Schiffer attempted to concretize Grice’s proposal by combining it with
Lewis’s (; ) theory of linguistic convention, which itself explicates conven-
tions in terms of participants’ common knowledge about their regularities of belief
and behavior. As a result, we find Loar and Schiffer saying things like this:
If we knew all the communicative intentions and other propositional
attitudes of members of P, as well as their correlations with utterances
Baron Cohen (); Baron-Cohen et al. (); Carey (); Carruthers (); Fodor ();
Frith and Frith (); Leslie (, ); Leslie et al. (); Scholl and Leslie (, ).
E.g. Carruthers (, ).
Goldman (, ); Gordon (, ); Heal ().
See also Loar (; ; ; ) and Schiffer (; ; ).

of sentences of L within P, and if we had time enough and computa-
tional power for ideal reflection, we could then directly infer a priori
that L is the language of P. (Loar ; reprinted in Loar , )
…once we have decided on a scheme of attributing propositional atti-
tudes to a population—and that is presupposed, in Lewis’s theory and
in mine, in assigning a language to a population—then there is a non-
arbitrary way of selecting one grammar. (Loar, , )
Loar follows Lewis in taking a language to be a pairing of sentences with meanings
and a grammar to be a finite specification of a language. If population members’
propositional attitudes determine the language they use, then they also determine
the meanings of all of the sentences of their language. And if their propositional
attitudes determine the grammar that we should attribute to them, then all of the
semantic properties of their language are thereby determined. But if semantics is
the study of a semantic module, as I have claimed, then this is incorrect. The body
of information that determines the semantic properties of the language I speak is
not what I believe or know, but rather the proprietary database of a mechanism that
plays a causal role in the interpretation and production of meaningful speech.
7 Explication versus Explanation
Intentionalists have sometimes shown recognition of the phenomena that have led
me to posit the modularity of semantics. Near the end ofMind and Meaning, Loar
(, ) argues that “the Chomskyan idea of the internalization of the generative
procedures of a grammar has got to be invoked to make sense of the entrenchment
of a grammar, and therefore tomake sense of literalmeaning” and goes on to say that
“the exact force of this can’t be spelled out antecedently to a detailed psycholinguistic
theory”. In saying these things, Loar stands at the edge of an empirically informed
inquiry into the actual psychological underpinnings of our linguistic competence.
But he turns back. His top priority is to give necessary-and-sufficient condi-
tions for the meaningfulness of expressions. And although what actually explains
our semantic competence with a language may be certain contingent features of our
psychological makeup, Loar judges that these aren’t essential features of users of a
language like ours. Two users of the same language could have different psycholog-
ical makeups, he reasons. He therefore goes on to say that his view ultimately does
not depend on “whether a psycholinguistic theory of such an adventurous kind is
true” (Loar, , ).
Elsewhere, Loar (, ) spells out this line of thought more explicitly:

There may be a Chomsky sense of knowledge — having an internal
representation — in which a speaker knows the rules of his language,
but that is a psychological hypothesis and, however reasonable it is, we
do not want to build it into an explication of what it is for L to be the
language of P. Better that it should be offered, at a later stage, as an
explanation of how it is possible for a complex entity like English to be
the language of the population of English speakers.
I think that this passage helps us to see the downside of the traditional, explication-
driven methodology. In the quest to give necessary-and-sufficient conditions that
apply to all actual and possible users of a language, we are driven to prescind from
more andmore of the actual psychological details of how how humans use language
to communicate, since there could be creatures who outwardly use language like us
but whose psychological inner-workings are different. Explication and explana-
tion become competing goals in a situation of this kind; achieving the former forces
us to postpone the latter.
Indeed, Loar and (early) Schiffer don’t prescind far enough. Their propositional-
attitude-laden explications aren’t even true of humans—or so I have argued. Some-
thing that abstracts even more from psychological detail is needed. Schiffer (,
ch.; ) addresses this problem in more recent work, where he argues that se-
mantic competence is a matter of having some “information-processing state” that
plays the “knowledge-of-meaning role”. To play this role, a state must causally me-
diate between perception of an utterance and a belief that the speaker thereby per-
formed a speech act with a certain kind of content and a certain kind of force. This
is a role that could be played by propositional attitudes or, as I have argued, by an
information-processing mechanism that is isolated from cognition. Grice ()
formulates a similar proposal, on which the meaning of an utterance-type is expli-
cated in terms of the “procedures” that language users have “in their repertoires”
to use the expression with certain intentions. Grice does not say what it is to have
this kind of procedure in one’s repertoire, though nothing that he says rules out ei-
ther a theory involving propositional attitudes or one involving an informationally
isolated language system.
Here Schiffer and Grice prescind almost completely from psychological mech-
anisms. In so doing, they almost completely forsake explanation in favor of expli-
cation. In response to the question of how we comprehend speech, the accounts
of Schiffer and Grice can tell us only that we possess some information-processing
state or procedure for doing so.
In the the traditional, Nagelian model of inter-theoretic reduction, explication
(via bridge principles) is supposed to yield explanation by showing us how to re-
I confess that I did the same in my dissertation (Harris, , chs.–).

duce a less-established, high-level theory to a better-established, low-level theory.
But because they take our linguistic capacities to be multiply realizable, Loar and
Schiffer’s quest for explication instead leads them away from explanation.
A common response to this kind of dilemma is to abandon the search for necess-
ary-and-sufficient conditions and settle for sufficient conditions instead. In place
of explication-driven reduction, we could seek supervenience relations, grounding
relations, or some other asymmetric dependence relation that holds between the
semantic facts and the psychological facts that underlie them—in actual humans
if not in some hypothetical behaviorally similar beings. In his last work on inten-
tionalism, Loar () makes this move, articulating a “minimal Gricean thesis” as
follows: “Facts about speakers’ intentions together with certain other psychologi-
cal factors asymmetrically determine social meaning; the latter conceptually super-
venes, asymmetrically, on the former” (Loar ; reprinted in , ). Given
my approach to intentionalism, I take it to be true that the semantic facts supervene
on (and are grounded in) facts about human psychology. The interesting question
is: which facts about human psychology? The best way to answer this question is to
engage in the project of mechanistic explanation that I advocated in §. The right
supervenience (or grounding) claims will be little more than summaries of the re-
sults of this project.
8 Non-Communicative Language Use
I want to show how the methodology that I have recommended can help the inten-
tionalist program to make some progress. To do this, I will consider the perennial
objection that intentionalism fails tomake sense of non-communicative uses of lan-
guage.
The objection usually takes the following form. Intentionalists tell us that to
mean something by an utterance one must intend to change the mental state of an
addressee. But we often use language—meaningfully, it seems—in ways that aren’t
naturally described in these terms. Wilson and Sperber (, ) imagine some-
one saying ‘please don’t rain’ while looking up at a cloudy sky, or muttering ‘start,
damn you!’ at their car. We often talk to our pets and babies, we practice speeches
out loud, and we write in diaries. We speak or write with the aim of better articulat-
ing inchoate ideas rather than in order to communicate them to others. We seem to
engage in inner speech—a kind of thought that happens in the medium of natural
language. These all look like non-communicative uses of language. In particular,
Some influential versions of this objection include those by Chomsky (, –) and Car-
ruthers (, ch.). The objection is also one that tends to come up a lot outside print.

these seem to be meaningful uses of language in the absence of communicative in-
tentions.
The traditional intentionalist has a few options for how to respond, and needn’t
apply any one strategy to all cases.
We should sometimes say that the speaker does have the communicative inten-
tions in question. When writing a diary, a speaker may intend to communicate with
their future self. Confronted with someone who is talking to a cat or muttering at
their car, it might be best to say that they are suffering from a momentary lapse of
rationality: they are acting acting in ways that don’t make sense given what they
believe, as they would likely admit if pressed.
In other cases, we should deny that the speaker really means anything. When
practicing a speech one engages in pretense, whichmust be distinguished from gen-
uine speaker meaning, just as practicing the footwork for a dance routine should be
distinguished from dancing (cf. Grice , ). When I am writing in order to
clarifymy thoughts or engaging in inner speech, I am engaged in a different-enough
activity than when I am speaking to another person that it is unhelpful to group
them together for theoretical purposes.
We should not be surprised if these defensive strategies don’t satisfy all skeptics.
They can seem ad hoc. For the skeptic who is still wedded to the method of cases,
they may in some cases seem question-begging, since they deny intuitions that the
skeptic brings to us as evidence. More importantly, these responses can be accused
of missing the real force of some of the purported counterexamples. Traditional
intentionalists can explain these cases away, but they offer us few positive resources
to explain what people are up to in these cases, or why using language would be a
good way to do it.
Some of these uses of language seem to pose threats to the basic assumptions
of intentionalism—threats that the above responses don’t seem to address. The idea
that we use language to clarify our thoughts seems to entail that the content of one’s
utterance is sometimes more articulate than the intention one has in expressing it.
But how could this be compatible with the claim that what one says is fully deter-
mined by one one intends in saying it? And we seem to be put into a vicious circle
by the claim that we sometimes think in natural language together with the inten-
tionalist claim that the meanings of natural-language expressions can be explained
in terms of the contents of our thoughts.
The human tendency to anthropomorphize inanimate objects is an active topic of psychological
research. We tend to anthropomorphize objects when they violate our expectations, including when
theymalfunction (Epley et al., ). Mandelbaum and Ripley (, ) argue, for example, that we
aremuchmore likely to anthropomorphize a car if it doesn’t workwell. It is a relatively straightforward
prediction of intentionalism that phenomena that cause us to anthropomorphize a non-agent will also
make us more likely to direct utterances to it.

Loar articulates a related worry:
The strong thesis is then open to the reasonable objection that, intu-
itively, natural language meaning could be constituted independently
of the use of language in communication. There are such phenomena as
working out ideas on a word processor, thinking out loud in sentences,
engaging in inner speech: can we not conceive of settings in which they
stand on their own, independently of communication? And, more ba-
sically, there is the possibility that we normally think, at least in part,
in a natural language, that our beliefs and intentions depend on hav-
ing internalized some natural language, perhaps even in a way that is
not typically phenomenologically available. I doubt that it can be ar-
gued persuasively on philosophical grounds that this makes no sense.
It does not seem to be an obvious conceptual truth that such private
meaningful uses of language would presuppose, even indirectly, com-
municative intentions or linguistic manifestations thereof. The strong
Gricean thesis is not something I am inclined to defend. (Loar ;
reprinted in , –)
This is not an objection to any particular Gricean explication. Rather, it is an objec-
tion to the whole intentionalist premise that the concepts of speaker meaning—and
so, communicative intentions—will play an essential role in explaining semantic no-
tions. The intentionalist’s concepts are tailor-made to explain communicative uses
of language. Loar raises the possibility that communication is just one use of lan-
guage among many, and so does not deserve a privileged position in an explanation
of how language works. In particular, since all of the uses of language that Loar
mentions seemingly depend on the semantic properties of words and sentences,
Loar’s line of thought raises serious doubts for the idea that the semantic facts can
ultimately be reduced to facts about the use of language to communicate, to the ex-
clusion of facts about other uses of language. This is one consideration that led
Loar to abandon the version of intentionalism that he had previously defended and
to fall back a weaker thesis that, he thought, “is perhaps not terribly exciting” (Loar,
, ).
These are serious objections, but I think that the methodological reorientation
I have been urging puts us in a position to answer them.
Suppose we approach the problem with an eye toward the mechanisms under-
lying our linguistic capacities. Confronted with a non-communicative use of lan-
guage, we must ask several questions. First, what is the point of using language in
this way? What are we doing, and why? Second, how do we do it? In particular:
See also Chomsky (, ff.).

what are the psychological mechanisms whose activities and interactions allow us
to use language in this way? Third: does our answer to the second question un-
dermine the aims and claims of intentionalism? In particular, does it show that
there are mechanisms underlying language use other than those that the intention-
alist must posit to explain communicative language use? If we can’t explain how
humans perform a certain linguistic activity in terms of the same mechanisms that
intentionalists posit to explain linguistic communication, that is a problem for in-
tentionalism. Otherwise, it’s hard to see what this objection really amounts to.
9 Some Non-Communicative Uses of Language:
A Sketch of an Intentionalist Account
Suppose that the picture of linguistic communication that I sketched in §§– is
correct. To communicate is to get one’s addressee to recognize one’s intention to
produce an effect in them. When we communicate linguistically, we make use of
an informationally isolated language system to encode and decode evidence of our
communicative intentions. When someone speaks, their language system takes in-
put from their planning system and encodes a partial and defeasible representation
of themental state they intend to produce, then passes this representation along to a
motor system, which turn it into an utterance. When someone perceives a linguistic
utterance, their language system decodes from it a semantic representation, which
they treat as a partial and defeasible piece of evidence about what kind of effect was
intended by the utterance.
This makes it sound as though the language system is a special-purpose device
for communicating with others. But note some things that I have not claimed: (i)
that the only thing for which we use the language system is interpersonal commu-
nication; (ii) that the biological function of the language system is communication
with others; or (iii) that the language system evolved for communication with oth-
ers. Although I find the last two of these claims to be plausible, I don’t want to
commit myself to them here. I see no good reason to accept (i) and some good rea-
sons to reject it. What I need, then, is an account of how a system that plays the
communicative role that I have posited it to play can also play various other roles as
well. There is nothing mysterious about this: a mechanism can do more than one
thing. I normally use my oven to cook food, but I could also turn it on in order to
warm up my kitchen. My infant daughter likes to use wooden spoons and measur-
ing cups as bath toys. Similarly, I propose that the language mechanism, as I have
already described it, can be used for purposes other than communication.
First, consider what goes into practicing a speech. In this case, my planning
system sends the same kind of speech plan to my language system that it would

send if I were actually giving a speech, but it does this as a way of implementing
a different kind of plan. When I am actually giving a speech, the speech plan that
my planning system sends to my language system is a subplan of a communicative
intention. This speech plan is the result of means-end reasoning about how to get
my point across to my actual addressee (or group of addressees). When rehearsing
a speech, I formulate a speech plan as a subplan of a different kind of intention—
an intention to pretend that I am giving a speech to a certain kind of audience. In
this case, the representation of the audience that my planning system sends to my
language system is a representation of a hypothetical audience that I’ve imagined
up. It is probably a relatively indefinite representation, but this will also be the case
when I give a speech to a roomful of people I don’t know.
By sending practice speech through my language system in this way, it may be
that I can primemy articulatorymechanisms for a smoother andmore skillful deliv-
ery later on. I can also listen to my own speech, feeding the outputs of my language
system back in as inputs. This may allow me to notice problems that were not ap-
parent at the planning stage, and so adjust my utterance plan to be a better means
to the communicative ends that I anticipate having later.
Feeding the outputs of my language system back in as inputs probably also has
other uses. I write things down and then read them later as a way of storing informa-
tion outside my head. In the much shorter term, I may remember a phone number
long enough to get out a pen and a piece of paper by repeating it out loud to myself
over and over. By feeding information back and forth through my language system
in this way, I can use it as a form of short-term memory.
Suppose that we sometimes engage in a version of this activity that doesn’t in-
volve actually producing an utterance. When I speak, my language system creates a
representation of the phonological properties of an utterance, which is then turned
into instructions for my motor systems. Sometimes this last step gets suppressed,
and the phonological representation is instead fed back into the language system as
an input. This process would amount to a kind of inner speech used for short-term
memory.
In fact, there is a large body of evidence that an inner-speech mechanism of
this kind plays a role in short-term memory. This mechanism, which is some-
times called the ‘phonological loop’ or ‘articulatory loop’, was posited by Baddeley
and Hitch () as one component in their influential model of working mem-
ory. According to this model, the phonological loop consists of a memory store
and a mechanism for either vocal or subvocal rehearsal. The memory store fades
quickly but can be refreshed by means of rehearsal. There is substantial evidence
For a recent overview of this model of working memory and the evidence that supports it, see
Baddeley ().

that subvocal rehearsal is performed by at least some of the same mechanisms that
we use to produce utterances. Speaking out loud, even in a way that would not
tax the memory store (such as repeating a single syllable), substantially interferes
with verbal working-memory performance, for example (Murray, ). There is
also substantial evidence that the storage and rehearsal mechanisms deal, at least
in part, in phonological representations rather than purely semantic representa-
tions. Phonologically similar strings of letters, numbers, or words are more diffi-
cult to store in verbal working memory than phonologically dissimilar strings, for
example—an interference effect that is usually explained by assuming that repre-
sentations in verbal working memory are stored in a phonological format, at least
in part (Baddeley, a,b; Conrad and Hull, ).
This line of thought suggests an explanation of how the language system, con-
ceived as amodular input-output system along the lines I have defended, could serve
a variety of non-communicative functions related to pretense, verbal practice, in-
ner speech, and memory. Such an account requires only a couple of speculative
hypotheses beyond what I have already defended. First, the utterance plans that
the planning system sends as inputs to the language system are sometimes subplans
of genuine communicative intentions, but are sometimes subplans of other kinds
of intentions, such as the intention to pretend to communicate or the intention to
hold something in memory for a short time. Second, inner speech depends on a
capacity to intercept the outputs of the language system and feed them back in as
inputs before they are turned into motor instructions, resulting in a use of language
that Baddeley () calls “subvocal-rehearsal”. These hypotheses aren’t obvious or
uncontroversial, but they are plausible, and they dovetail with a venerable tradition
of research on the role of linguistic processing in working memory.
What I have said so far does not on its own account for the puzzling ways in
which we are able to clarify our thoughts by speaking out loud or writing things
down. Why should sendingmy thoughts out through the language system and back
in again be a way of making them clearer?
Here is a way of answering this question that requires only one further specula-
tive hypothesis. Suppose that the instructions sent by planning systems to language
systems are sometimes imprecise—the product of thoughts that are, in some sense,
unclear. In particular, utterance plans of this kind aren’t precise enough to fully de-
termine what kind of utterance to produce. But suppose that the language system
is adept at taking imprecise instructions of this kind and making more or less arbi-
trary choices about how to turn them into an utterance. It has to pick some words
Following Baddeley (, ), my use of ‘phonological’ is not meant to invoke any particular
theoretical claims, including those of mainstream phonology. Rather, it is meant to capture the idea
that phonological representations include information relevant to articulation in a verbal medium.
Others sometimes use the term ‘phonetic’, ‘acoustic’, or ‘articulatory’ instead.

and arrange them into some syntactic structure, after all, and so it chooses options
that are within the range of what is specified, without crashing when the utterance
plan it has been given does not narrow the options all the way down.
If we grant this hypothesis, then we have the makings of an explanation of how
linguistic rehearsal—subvocal, vocal, orthographic, or otherwise—could be a pro-
cess by which wemake our thoughts more precise. Suppose I have an unclear inten-
tional state, σ. I form an intention to clarify σ through speech, and this intention
serves as a premise in means-end reasoning to an utterance plan of the kind that
might otherwise be a subplan of a communicative intention to produce σ in some-
one else. Because σ is unclear, this utterance plan underspecifies the utterance to
be produced, and so my language system must make some arbitrary choices in de-
signing an output. This output then becomes an input, which my language system
turns into a semantic representation—a partial specification of the kind of effect that
someone would intend by using the words that my language system chose. In some
cases, the result of this process will be a representation of amore precisemental state
than I set out to clarify in the first place. And in some cases, I might even prefer this
more precise mental state to the one with which I began and decide to adopt it as σ’s
replacement. If iterated, this procedure could serve as a selection process by which
we hone our thoughts over time.
This is just a sketch of the sort of process by which humans could use a modular
language system to clarify their thoughts. This sketch also makes sense of at least
one way in which humans could be said to think in language, either inwardly or
outwardly. It is a process by which we may sometimes transition from one thought
to another, sometimes improved thought. In some cases, the causal pathway of this
process is wholly contained within our heads. In others, it follows a trajectory out
through articulatory mechanisms and back in through sensory mechanisms. We
can say these things without positing a language system that is any more flexible
or elaborate than what I have posited to explain linguistic communication. We
need only say that we sometimes take advantage of this system’s processing ca-
pacities for purposes other than communication, and that we do so by sending it
the usual sorts of instructions—albeit sometimes less-than-fully-clear ones—but for
non-communicative reasons.
Of course, the story I have just told is speculative. In particular, a good deal
more needs to be said about what it is for one thought to be clearer than another.
Although having an unclear thought and clarifying it is something that most of us
would say that we regularly do—I am doing it right now!—it is an under-theorized
idea.
Still, my aim in sketching this hypothesis has not been to defend it in any de-
tail. I have presented it as an example of how the mechanistic reorientation that I
proposed in § and implemented in §§– can yield new explanatory resources that

give us fresh ways of thinking about old problems. The hypothesis I have offered is
promising and deserves to be fleshed out and empirically investigated. It suggests a
way of making progress on an issue that has dogged the intentionalist program for
over half a century. I, for one, will be pursuing it in future work.
10 Conclusions
I have argued that intentionalism should be pursued as a project in mechanistic
explanation rather than as a project in explication. Thus conceived, the research
program belongs to interdisciplinary cognitive science rather than philosophical
analysis. Its principal aim is to discern the contours of the cognitive architecture
underlying our capacity to communicate, rather than to formulate necessary-and-
sufficient conditions for statements about actual and possible communicators.
This methodological reorientation has several advantages. It allows us to turn
away from the fruitless pursuit of conceptual analyses and fromaquest for necessary-
and-sufficient conditions that has led to ever greater abstraction at the expense of
explanatory ambition. It puts the intentionalist program in contact with theoretical
resources from linguistics, the philosophy of action, and cognitive science that allow
us to formulate empirical claims that can be tested and iterated. And it dissolves ren-
ders tractable some objections that have perennially dogged intentionalism, such as
the problem of non-communicative language use. Instead of clashing intuitions or a
downward spiral of counterexamples, we are left with a scientific research program.
As I suggested in §, I think that this reorientation has been underway among
some intentionalists since the s. At the same time, it remains common to en-
counter new proposed explications of speaker meaning and new intuitive coun-
terexamples to these proposals. I hope that by explicitly describing and defending
my proposedmethodological reorientation, I can help us to move toward the future
of the intentionalist research program while learning from its past.
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